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ISSUE
Was the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals correct in concluding that
the Solomon Amendment likely vio-
lates the First Amendment by con-
ditioning the receipt of federal funds
on schools' relinquishment of their
constitutionally protected right to
exclude military recruiters?
FACTS
Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and the other petitioners
(collectively, the government) are
the heads of federal government
departments that would cut off
funding to schools that fail to give
equal access to military recruiters.
The Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights, Inc., and the
other respondents (collectively,
FAIR) are groups and individuals
who support freedom of association
for universities and oppose the mili-
tary's policy of excluding openly gay
service members. FAIR, the lead
respondent, is an association of uni-
versities and faculties, especially
faculties of law schools.
The case involves a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Solomon
Amendment, federal legislation
sponsored by U.S. Representative
Gerald Solomon (R-NY) and origi-
nally passed in 1994. The law origi-
nally mandated that "no federal
funds available to the Department of
Defense may be provided by grant
or contract to any institution of
higher education that has a policy of
denying, or which effectively pre-
vents, the Secretary of Defense from
obtaining for military recruiting pur-
poses ... entry to campuses or
access to students on campuses."
In subsequent years the Solomon
Amendment's funding condition was
expanded to include funds available
to universities from the Depart-
ments of Homeland Security, Health
and Human Services, Labor,
Education, and Transportation, as
well as the National Security
Administration and the Central
Intelligence Agency. Congress also
clarified that the condition applied
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to an entire university even if only a
"subelement" within the university
(e.g., a university's law school)
denied access to military recruiters.
Finally, in 2004, Congress further
required that, under the funding
condition, military recruiters must
be given access to the institution
"that is at least equal in quality and
scope to the access to campuses and
to students that is provided to any
other employer."
The Solomon Amendment runs afoul
of many universities' non-discrimina-
tion policies, which forbid discrimi-
nation on the basis of, among other
things, sexual orientation. Law
schools especially, both on their own
initiative and in compliance with the
guidelines of the American
Association of Law Schools, allow a
prospective employer to recruit stu-
dents in their facilities only if the
employer signs a statement pledging
not to discriminate on the basis of
several criteria, including sexual ori-
entation. The military, however, bans
service by openly gay personnel
under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy adopted by Congress in 1994.
Thus, many law schools have prohib-
ited, or would like to prohibit, mili-
tary recruiters from their campuses.
At the same time, universities do
not want to lose federal funding,
which totals more than S35 billion
annually and goes to many causes,
such as important scientific and
medical research. Thus, even law
schools that do not themselves
receive federal funds from any of
the agencies and departments cov-
ered by the Solomon Amendment
have reluctantly agreed to allow mil-
itary recruiters in their facilities.
This litigation is an effort to have
the Solomon Amendment declared
unconstitutional and thus to permit
law schools and other parts of a uni-
versity to bar military recruiting
without losing all federal funds as a
consequence.
In September 2003, FAIR (and the
other respondents) brought suit
against Rumsfeld (and the other
petitioners) in a New Jersey federal
district court, arguing that the
Solomon Amendment violated their
First Amendment rights. The dis-
trict court denied FAIR's request for
a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the Solomon
Amendment.
FAIR then appealed to the Third
Circuit. A divided panel of the Third
Circuit held that FAIR was likely to
prevail on its First Amendment
claims and directed the district
court to enjoin enforcement of the
Solomon Amendment. However, on
January 20, 2005, the Third Circuit
granted the government's request to
stay its decision pending appeal to
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted the
government's petition for writ of
certiorari on May 2, 2005.
CASE ANALYSIS
The government's basic argument is
that it may condition the receipt of
federal funds on the ability of the
military to recruit on campus the
very students whose education the
government funding supports. This
state interest is especially great, it
argues, in the military context in
which there is a strong national
need to recruit the best talent. This
is precisely what the Solomon
Amendment does. It does not man-
date that educational institutions
admit recruiters; instead, it places a
condition on funding. In short, the
government argues, if the schools do
not want to admit military recruiters
they are still free to bar them, they
just must forgo federal money.
FAIR's basic argument is that an
educational institution's decision to
bar military recruiters is constitu-
tionally protected, both as an
expression of moral and professional
disapproval of anti-gay discrimina-
tion and as an exercise of associa-
tional freedom. These constitutional
interests are especially important in
a setting, such as a university,
i where academic freedom is para-
mount. Thus, here as in other con-
texts, the government may not con-
dition the receipt of a broad array of
government benefits on the surren-
der of constitutional rights.
The government first urges that no
freedom of association is injured by
i the Solomon Amendment. The cen-
tral case in the argument between
the parties is the Court's 2000 deci-
sion in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), in which
the Court held that the Boy Scouts
had an associational right to
exclude an openly gay scoutmaster
despite a state law barring discrimi-
nation against gays.
The government distinguishes
Dale by noting that the Solomon
Amendment does not affect the
composition of the schools' member-
ship; the recruiters' presence is only
temporary and episodic. Further, the
government argues that unlike Dale,
this case does not involve an
attempt by the state to convey any
message about service by gays in the
military since everyone understands
that recruiters speak only for their
employers and not for the schools in
which they recruit. Finally, unlike
Dale, this case involves a condition
on funding, not a direct regulatory
mandate.
FAIR responds that the freedom of
association recognized in Dale is
indeed at stake in this case. The
Solomon Amendment, FAIR claims,
violates the schools' freedom of
association by infringing their "right
to choose for themselves which
causes to assist or resist." The free-
dom of association is not limited to
the ability to control membership in
an organization, FAIR argues, but
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extends to the full range of associa-
tional activities by which a group
aids or refuses to aid a cause.
The government next argues that
the Solomon Amendment does not
violate the "compelled speech" doc-
trine, under which citizens may
refuse to be made the mouthpiece
for some message the government
would like to send. The Solomon
Amendment, argues the govern-
ment, simply does not force schools
to send the message that they agree
with the military's exclusion of gays.
FAIR counters that the Solomon
Amendment does compel speech. It
requires the schools to serve mili-
tary recruiters affirmatively through
quintessential "speech" activities,
like distributing, posting, and print-
ing literature announcing the pres-
ence of the recruiters; introducing
students to the government; and
sponsoring private forums for the
exchange of information (the
recruiting interview sessions them-
selves). This, argues FAIR, requires
a school "to disseminate, carry, or
host a message against its will."
The government further argues that
the schools' refusal to admit mili-
tary recruiters is not a form of
''expressive conduct" protected
under the intermediate scrutiny
standard of United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Refusing to give recruiters equal
access to facilities, argues the gov-
ernment, is not inherently expres-
sive. Refusing such access is merely
conduct and as such does not enjoy
any First Amendment speech pro-
tection. Even if the O'Brien inter-
mediate scrutiny standard applied,
moreover, the government argues
that the Solomon Amendment satis-
fies that standard since it is suffi-
ciently tailored to achieving the gov-
ernment's important goal of hiring
the best talent for military service
and does not aim at speech for the
purpose of suppressing ideas.
FAIR argues that, on the contrary,
the schools' refusal to allow employ-
ers who discriminate to recruit is
part of its overall message that such
discrimination is immoral. Barring
recruiters who discriminate is a way
to "punctuate" a school's message
by refusing to assist discrimination.
Moreover, argues FAIR, the Solomon
Amendment is not narrowly tailored
to serve the government's admitted-
ly compelling interest in military
recruitment. There is no evidence,
argues FAIR, that military recruiters
require access to schools in order to
meet recruiting goals, much less
that the military must have "equal
access" to achieve its recruiting
goals.
Finally, the government argues that
the Solomon Amendment does not
violate the "unconstitutional condi-
tions" doctrine, under which the
government generally may not con-
dition the receipt of a government
benefit on the relinquishment of a
constitutional right. First, the gov-
ernment contends that the Solomon
Amendment would be constitutional
even if it were imposed as a direct
mandate requiring the schools to
admit military recruiters on an
equal basis with all other employers.
Since there is no constitutional
right enjoyed by the schools to
exclude military recruiters, the
government reasons, they have not
been required to relinquish the
exercise of any right in order to get
a government benefit. Congress has
not aimed at the suppression of
ideas by adopting the Solomon
Amendment, the government
argues; it has simply used its consti-
tutional power to spend in the inter-
ests of the nation.
FAIR responds that the Solomon
Amendment places a penalty on the
exercise of First Amendment rights
and thus violates the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine. This is
not a case, notes FAIR, in which the
government has simply required
that certain funds be used only for
the purpose for which they are pro-
vided (e.g., the government may
require that education funds be
spent on education). Instead, the
Solomon Amendment attempts a
sweeping denial of almost all federal
assistance to an entire educational
institution merely because one part
of it-a part that might itself receive
no federal money-refuses to allow
the military to recruit.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case rests at the intersection of
three great controversies in modern
American law and life. First, there
are the needs of the military to
recruit the best and brightest in a
time of war and uncertainty about
national security. The schools' deci-
sions to exclude military recruiters
would never be a very popular
one-less so in present circum-
stances. To many, universities'
exclusion of the militarv looks like
the action 6f an elite caste mocking
the soldiers who guard them while
they sleep.
Second, the case is set in the con-
text of the ongoing cultural struggle
over whether discrimination against
gays is ever acceptable and, if so,
under what circumstances. To the
schools, the exclusion of the mili-
tary recruiters is a way to defend
their moral perspective that dis-
crimination against gays in the mili-
tary is wrong and contrary to their
professional standards. The use of
Dale, which held that gays could be
excluded from an association, to
justify excluding those who exclude
gays, is an especially ironic note in
the litigation.
Third, the case raises the questions
of the extent of government power
over the lives of its citizens and of
the continuing vitality of federal-
ism-the relationship between the
(Continued on Page 146)
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states and the federal government.
Government power to suppress con-
stitutional rights has historically
taken the form of old-fashioned
compulsion: for example, a threat of
jail for failure to abide by the gov-
ernment's command. However, in an
age of vast federal spending, govern-
ment power to compel conduct is
more likely to take the form of con-
ditions placed on that spending.
When that form of compulsion
affects state institutions, like a state
university, the central question
ceases to be simply about the rela-
tionship between the federal govern-
ment and the individual citizen and
begins to be about the relationship
between the federal government and
the states.
To accept FAIR's claim, the Court
will likely have to conclude both
that (1) a school's decision to bar
military recruiters is the exercise of
a constitutional right (freedom of
speech and/or freedom of associa-
tion) and that (2) the government's
denial of funding to the entire uni-
versity for the exercise of this liber-
ty is an unconstitutional penalty or
condition.
To accept the government's claim,
the Court need only agree with the
government on one of these points.
The Court could conclude, for
example, that barring military
recruiters from campus is not con-
stitutionally protected (so that even
a mandate to allow them would be
acceptable). In that case, the Court
would not even have to rule on the
conditional funding question.
Alternatively, the Court could con-
clude that the exclusion of military
recruiters is indeed constitutionally
protected, but that the government
may refuse to give any funding to
schools that bar recruiters.
Whichever way the Court rules, it
will have the opportunity to clarify
some rather murky constitutional
doctrines. First, there is the question
of the reach of the freedom of associ-
ation. Is it, as the government con-
tends, a doctrine that protects only
i the membership decisions a group
makes? Or is it a much broader right
that protects many associational
activities by which a group promotes
its message? If it is the former, the
freedom of association is not a very
robust doctrine, since it leaves the
state free to hobble a group's mes-
sage in numerous indirect ways. If it
is the latter, the freedom of associa-
tion risks giving expressive groups a
broad right to refuse to comply with
general regulations backed by impor-
tant state interests.
Second, there is the question of how
broadly the Court defines the
unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine. If the government may deny
an entire university all funding (e.g.,
cancer research funding) because
one part of the university exercises
a constitutional right, could it simi-
larly leverage its economic power to
require the university to allow a
military officer on campus to deliver
the government's message about the
need for high defense spending?
Could it threaten to withdraw all
university funding unless the uni-
versity agreed to forgo its right to
"ameliorate" the recruiters' pres-
ence on campus (e.g., by posting
written notices outside the inter-
view room indicating the school's
disagreement with the military's
exclusion of gays)?
If, on the other, the government
can't condition funding in this way,
could it continue to condition fund-
ing on a school's agreement not to
discriminate against students or
employees on the basis of race or
sex (as it now does through civil
rights laws)? Or is there some way
to distinguish the conditional fund-
ing embedded in civil rights law
from the Solomon Amendment, as
FAIR and its amici suggest?
Of course, there is always the possi-
bility that the Court will rule with-
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